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Deception is often necessary in false memory studies, especially when the study aims to 
explore the effect of misinformation on memory. At the end of the study, participants are 
debriefed, but does this eliminate the influence of misinformation? In the current study, 
we followed up 630 participants six months after they participated in a study in which 
they were exposed to fabricated political news stories. We compared the memories of 
these ‘continuing participants’ for both novel and previously seen news stories to the 
memories of 474 newly recruited participants. Relative to new recruits, continuing 
participants were less likely to report a false memory for a story that they had been 
previously exposed to, and they were also less likely to report a false memory for a novel 
fake news story. Continuing participants were more likely to report a memory for 
previously seen true events than novel true events. Both groups of participants reported 
enjoying the experience and feeling confident that they understood which stories were 
fabricated. Importantly, this study did not find any negative long-term effects of 
participating in our false memory experiment, and even exhibited some positive effects.  
 
Keywords: False memory, misinformation, debriefing, politics  
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False memory studies often involve necessary deception. Participants are 
presented with some misinformation and their acceptance or rejection of that 
misinformation is recorded. Then, typically, participants are debriefed and told about the 
misinformation before they leave the study. For example, a participant might see a thief 
with a green jacket steal a wallet and later be told that the jacket was brown. Many will 
later ‘remember’ seeing a brown jacket. The participant is debriefed at the end of the study 
and we assume we have ‘taken back’ that misinformation. But what has happened to their 
memory? If tested later, would they now remember the true detail (green) or would they 
remember the misinformation (brown)? In other areas of psychological research, studies 
have shown that retracting information does not entirely remove its sway (Cabalo et al., 
2020; de Keersmacker & Roets, 2017; Thorson, 2016). This ‘continued influence effect’ 
(Johnson & Seifert, 1994) is often evident even when warnings are provided to 
participants before exposure (Ecker et al., 2010). Individuals may experience source-
confusion, where they remember the misinformation but not where it came from (Johnson 
et al., 1993) or the correction may even backfire, increasing belief in the misinformation 
(Lewandowsky et al., 2012).  
It is clear from the literature that retraction of misinformation is difficult and the 
consequences can be complex. Clark et al., (2012) had participants perform actions in the 
lab and two days later showed them a video that was doctored to appear as if they had 
performed additional actions. Participants were debriefed, which reduced belief that they 
had performed these additional actions. However, debriefing did not eliminate 
participants’ false memories of performing these actions.  There is a large body of 
literature that suggests that recollection and belief are independent-co-occurring 
constructs, and ‘non-believed memories’ can remain, after a memory is refuted (Mazzoni 
et al., 2010).  Belief can be described as ‘the truth value attributed to the occurrence of an 
event’ (Scoboria et al., 2014, p 1243). As pointed out by Scoboria and colleagues (2004), 
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one can believe that an event happened without remembering it (such as believing you 
were born). One can also recollect something without believing it really happened (such as 
remembering seeing Santa Claus come down the chimney as a child). Otgaar et al. (2013) 
planted false memories for a childhood experience and later debriefed participants, 
informing them that the event had never occurred. Of those who had described a false 
memory during the study, forty percent reported a non-believed memory after the 
debriefing. Outside of laboratory settings, research has shown that non-believed 
autobiographical memories are relatively common amongst the general public (Mazzoni et 
al., 2010; Otgaar et al., 2019; Scoboria & Talarico, 2013). This raises the concern that 
reducing belief in a fabricated event may not entirely eliminate a false memory (Otgaar et 
al., 2014).  
There are many contexts where the deliberate and persistent alteration of memory 
and beliefs may be especially problematic. One such area of study is the effect of ‘fake 
news’, and many studies have attempted to plant false memories for fabricated political 
events (e.g. Frenda et al., 2013; Murphy et al. 2019; Nash, 2018; Saachi et al., 2007). A 
2018 meta-analysis showed that misinformation related to real-world events is more 
challenging to correct than constructed misinformation (e.g., referring to a fictional crime), 
and that misinformation pertaining to politics is especially resistant to retraction (Walter 
& Murphy, 2018). In particular, misinformation that is in line with existing beliefs is 
generally processed more fluently and thus less likely to be successfully retracted 
(Lewandowsky et al., 2012).  It is important to assess whether the debriefing procedures 
in these political false memory studies are sufficient. After participants are debriefed and 
return to their daily lives, are they more vulnerable than non-participants to forming false 
memories for the event that they were presented with during the study? 
When assessing whether exposure to a news story during a research study might 
increase false memories or beliefs for that news story later, we might also consider the 
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wealth of research on the illusory truth effect. Hasher, Goldstein & Toppino (1977) 
presented participants with trivia statements on three occasions and had them rate their 
accuracy. They found that statements that had been previously encountered were rated as 
more accurate than novel statements. Numerous studies have replicated this effect (see 
Dechêne et al. (2010) for a meta-analysis). The dominant explanation for this ‘illusory 
truth effect’ is that repeated exposure increases processing fluency, leading to increased 
perceptions of accuracy (Unkelbach & Greifeneder, 2013). Recently, Pennycook et al., 
(2018) assessed the illusory truth effect in relation to fake news. Participants were 
exposed to political fake news headlines such as ‘Mike Pence: Gay Conversion Therapy 
Saved my Marriage’ in a familiarization stage and then again in an assessment stage where 
they were asked to rate the accuracy of both novel and previously-seen headlines. 
Participants were twice as likely to perceive a story as true if they had previously 
encountered it, both when the second stage took place immediately and after a one-week 
delay. Across seven studies investigating the illusory truth effect for trivia statements and 
fake news headlines, De keersmaecker et al., (2019) found that this effect was not 
moderated by individual differences in cognitive ability, need for cognitive closure or 
cognitive style. Thus it appears the illusory truth effect is a robust phenomenon and 
repeated exposure to inaccurate information is likely to increase perceived truthfulness. 
As participation in a false memory study can involve repeated exposure to fabricated 
information (during the study and perhaps again during the debriefing process), it is 
possible that this illusory truth effect may increase rates of false memory at follow-up.   
In the current study, as well as assessing the potential risks of participating in a 
false memory study, we assessed some potential benefits. There is a lack of research on 
participant perspectives on false memory studies, though anecdotally, many participants 
report enjoying memory tests and fake news surveys, despite the deception involved. As 
stated in the British Psychological Society’s Code of Human Research Ethics: ‘If the 
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reaction of participants when deception is revealed later in their participation is likely to 
lead to discomfort, anger or objections from the participants then the deception is 
inappropriate’ (British Psychological Society, 2014, p24). As there is mixed evidence as to 
whether participants often object to deception in psychology studies (Hertwig & Ortmann, 
2008), we assessed how participants in the current study felt about the false memory 
manipulation and whether they would participate in such a study again. Furthermore, we 
assessed whether previous participation in our false memory study may have been 
educational; specifically, we evaluated whether participants estimated false memories to 
be more or less common if they had previously taken part in a false memory study and 
been debriefed. There is debate as to how widespread memory myths are amongst the 
general public (Brewin et al., 2019; Otgaar et al., 2020; Simons & Chabris, 2011) and it is 
unclear if participation in a false memory study impacts these opinions.  
 
The Current Study 
In the current study, we examined the memories of participants who six months 
previously had been exposed to fake news, and debriefed after the study. The false 
memory study concerned campaign events from the 2018 Irish abortion referendum (see 
Murphy, et al., 2019, for full details). The study took place in May 2018, one week before 
the referendum. Participants were shown real and fabricated news stories about the 
campaign and asked if they remembered them and how they had felt at the time. We found 
that fake news stories were more likely to be “remembered” by voters whose belief the 
story supported (i.e., a made-up scandal about the No campaign was more likely to be 
falsely remembered by Yes voters, and vice versa). In the current study, we followed up 
with these original participants, presenting them with previously seen and novel news 
stories. We compared true and false memories reported by these participants at follow-up 
with those reported by a group of newly recruited control participants. We tested two 
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competing hypotheses: 1) that debriefing would reduce future false memory effects, as 
intended, and 2) that debriefing would increase false memory effects, in line with the 
illusory truth effect. We also investigated whether participants enjoyed taking part in the 
study and believed it had improved their understanding of the topic, as well as whether it 
resulted in higher estimates of the prevalence of false memories.   




The sample consisted of 1106 participants, two of whom were removed after indicating in 
their responses that they had attended a talk given by one of the authors about the first 
research study and used that to identify the fabricated stories. This left a total of 1104 
eligible participants, 630 ‘continuing participants’ from the prior study and 474 newly 
recruited participants.  
 
Continuing participants. For participants who had been previously exposed to the 
fake news stories (n = 630), the average age was 37.50 (SD = 13.68). Most (443) were 
female, 182 were male, and two selected Prefer Not to Say.  The majority of the sample 
(90%, n = 569) was classified as Yes voters (537 who voted Yes to repeal the ban on 
abortion and 32 who didn’t vote but would have voted yes). There were 60 No voters (57 
who voted to retain the ban on abortion and three who didn’t vote but would have voted 
no).  One participant selected ‘Didn’t Vote and Wasn’t Leaning Either Way’. These 
participants were recruited for the original study via an article on an online news site 
(TheJournal.ie), social media, and university staff and student emails.  
Newly recruited participants. For participants who had not been previously 
exposed to the fake news stories (n = 474), the average age was 38.45 (SD = 12.88). Of 
these participants, 334 were female, 135 were male, and five selected Other or Prefer Not 
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to Say.  The majority of the sample (88%, n = 418) were classified as Yes voters (383 who 
voted Yes to repeal the ban on abortion and 35 who didn’t vote but would have voted yes). 
There were 52 No voters (46 who voted to retain the ban on abortion and 6 who didn’t 
vote but would have voted no). The remaining participants selected ‘Didn’t Vote and 
Wasn’t Leaning Either Way’ (n = 3) or ‘Prefer Not to Say’ (n = 1). These participants were 
recruited for the longitudinal study via an article on the same online news site 
(TheJournal.ie), social media, and university student emails.  
The continuing and newly recruited participants were not significantly different 
from each other on a number of measures assessed at the six-month follow-up, including 
age, t (1076) = 1.16, p = .25, and a range of referendum-related items: personal importance 
of the referendum, t (966.02) = 1.55, p = .12; referendum-related media consumption, t 
(1100) = 0.26, p = .79; and referendum-related discussions with family and friends, t 
(1100) = 0.94, p = .35. 
 
Previous Study 
 Our first study was conducted via an online survey in the week preceding the 
abortion referendum, which took place on May 26th 2018 (for full details see Murphy et al., 
2019). Along with four true news stories, participants were presented with two fabricated 
stories: one concerning illegal campaign posters funded by foreign lobby groups and one 
concerning distasteful comments made by campaigners. Both stories had two versions; for 
example, one version in which the Yes campaign had to destroy illegal posters, and one 
version in which the No campaign had to destroy illegal posters. Participants saw only one 
version of each story in this first study (i.e., either the Yes or No version of each item). 
Participants were first asked if they remembered each event. They were then told that 
they may have been presented with some fake news and were asked to pick any stories 
they suspected to be fake. Finally, participants were debriefed and told ‘you were shown 
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two entirely fabricated events - the stories below were invented by the researchers and 
never happened. You should know that these events are entirely false and should in no 
way be taken into account when deciding how to vote.’ Participants were then presented 
with the fake story once again, with the word FALSE printed before the story text. All 
continuing participants had therefore seen the fake news story and been debriefed, though 





Participants viewed four news stories; one that was novel and true, one that was 
novel and fabricated, one taken from the previous study that was true and one taken from 
the previous study that was fabricated. The stories are shown in Appendix A. The stories 
were counterbalanced by block so that participants saw a mix of stories about each side of 
the referendum. Continuing participants were randomly assigned to view either the same 
story they had seen in the pre-referendum study or the other unseen version. For example, 
out of those that saw the Yes version of the poster story originally, half of them saw the 
Yes poster story again in this study, while the other half saw the No version of the poster 
story in this study. Participants were randomized to view one of two blocks of news 
stories. Block One contained the repeated fake story about illegal Yes posters, a repeated 
true story about actors supporting the Yes campaign, a novel true story about the Pope 
criticizing the referendum outcome, and a novel fake story about Facebook apologizing for 
allowing foreign interference in the referendum. Block Two contained the repeated fake 
story about illegal No posters, a repeated true story about athletes supporting the No 
campaign, a novel true story about a pro-choice memorial in Dublin and a novel fake story 
about Facebook apologizing for allowing foreign interference in the referendum (the same 
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story that appeared in Block One). Within each block, stories were presented in a random 
order. After each news story, participants were asked ‘Do you remember this event?’ and 
could select an option from ‘I remember seeing/hearing this’, ‘I don't remember 
seeing/hearing this but I remember it happening’, ‘I don't have a specific memory of this 
but I believe it happened’, ‘I remember this differently’ and ‘I don't remember this’. 
Participants were also asked a question about when each event happened, if they 
did recall the event. Each question was phrased to specifically refer to a part of the story, 
e.g. ‘According to your memory, when were the posters taken down?’; ‘According to your 
memory, when was this apology issued?’ etc. Participants could respond by entering text 
into a response box. This question was included to ensure that any reported memories 
were genuine memories of the event occurring and not participants reporting that they 
remembered the story from our previous study.  
False Memory Estimate 
Participants were asked, ‘If some of the stories presented in this study were 
fabricated (events that never happened), what percentage of participants do you think 
would falsely remember them as true?’ and could answer using a 0%-100% slider.  
Participant Feedback 
At the end of the study, participants answered questions about their experience of 
participating, rating their agreement with the following statements on a scale from 1 
(Strongly Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree): ‘I am confident in my understanding of which 
stories are true and which are fabricated’, ‘If I were to see these fabricated stories again, I 
am confident that I would identify them as fake’, ‘I feel I understand more about the 
phenomenon of false memories’, ‘I enjoyed participating in this part of the study’, ‘I find it 
interesting to test my susceptibility to fake news’.  
 
Procedure 
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Participants who completed the first study were asked to sign up for a year-long 
study of memories of the referendum that would require them to fill out four online 
surveys (in June 2018, August 2018, November 2018 & May 2019). The ‘continuing 
participants’ in the current analyses all signed up at this point, immediately after the first 
study. One week after the referendum, we distributed the first wave of the longitudinal 
study to both these original participants, and the newly recruited participants. Each wave 
of the longitudinal study contained a range of questions related to the referendum, 
assessing current feelings, flashbulb memories and event memories. The data discussed in 
this paper comes from the six-month follow-up (wave 3 of 4) that was distributed at the 
end of November 2018. The newly recruited participants in the present study had 
therefore answered previous questions about their memory of the referendum, but had 
not been presented with any fake news stories.  
In the six-month follow-up study, news stories were presented to participants at 
the end of the survey. The introduction to this section read ‘Next we will show you four 
news headlines from the 8th Amendment Referendum. We would like you to indicate if 
you remember the event and to think about how specific your memory for that event is, 
using the options provided’. Participants were presented with four news stories each, 
reporting whether they remembered the event and when they remembered it happening.  
After viewing all four stories, participants were told: ‘Some participants who 
undertook this survey were shown fake news stories (stories concerning events that did 
not happen, entirely fabricated by the researchers). If you think you may have been shown 
any fake stories, please select any story you believe to be fake below’ and could select as 
many of the four stories as they wished. Participants were also asked to estimate, if any of 
the stories were fake, how many people would falsely remember them as true. 
The next page presented the two fabricated stories and explained that they were 
entirely fake. Participants were asked, ‘If you selected either of these stories as fake, what 
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was it that helped you to identify the story as fabricated?’ and could answer using an open-
response text box. The purpose of this question was to find out whether participants relied 
on their memory of the previous study to identify the fake stories. Participants were also 
asked to once again estimate what proportion of respondents would have falsely 
remembered the events as having happened. Finally, participants completed the feedback 






All data are available at https://osf.io/9j6ka/. Participants who reported either a 
specific memory of hearing about an event or a more general memory that it had 
happened were classified as remembering that event. Those who said they did not 
remember an event or remembered it differently were classed as not remembering that 
event. In our analyses comparing memories, those who reported a belief that an event had 
happened, but not a memory, were excluded (unless otherwise stated). This mirrors the 
classification used in our original study (Murphy et al., 2019) and is motivated by a need to 
clearly discriminate between memories and mere beliefs (Wade et al., 2018).  Across the 
entire sample, 22% of participants reported a false memory; 17% reported a false memory 
for one fabricated story and 5% reported a false memory for both of the fabricated stories 
shown. A further 14% reported a belief that at least one fabricated event had happened.  
Fabricated Stories 
Our primary interest was whether continuing participants would have a higher rate 
of false memories for the previously seen fabricated stories, relative both to their first 
exposure and to newly recruited participants. A McNemar’s test showed that the rate of 
false memory for the poster story for continuing participants in the follow-up study (14%) 
was significantly lower than their rate in the first study in May (24%), X2(1, N = 509) = 
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18.85, p < .001. Continuing participants were also less likely to report a memory for the 
poster story (14%) than the newly recruited participants (21%), X2 (1, N = 993) = 7.21, p = 
.007, V = 0.09. This did not change if we used a broader classification of memory, including 
both memories and beliefs; continuing participants were less likely to report a memory or 
belief for the poster story (22%) than newly recruited participants (30%), X2 (1, N = 1104) 
= 7.30, p = .007, V = 0.08 (see Figure 1). Those who were presented with the same version 
of the poster story on both occasions (concerning either the Yes or No campaign) were no 
more likely to report a false memory for the poster story at follow-up (13%) than those 
who saw a different version at follow-up (15%), X2 (1, N = 571) = 0.44, p = .51.  
At follow-up, all participants were also presented with a new fabricated story 
concerning foreign interference in the referendum via Facebook. Continuing participants 
were significantly less likely to report a false memory for this story (9%) than newly 
recruited participants (16%), X2 (1, N = 1010) = 12.46, p < .001, V = .11. This was also true 
if we used a broader classification of memory, including both memories and beliefs (as 
shown in Figure 2). Continuing participants were less likely to report a memory or belief 
for the new Facebook story (16%) than newly recruited participants (25%), X2 (1, N = 
1104) = 14.44, p = <.001, V = 0.11 
We used a hierarchical binary logistic regression to assess what factors predicted 
whether continuing participants reported a false memory for an event that they had 
already been told was fabricated. Here the responses were collapsed across Yes/No 
versions of the poster story and only remembered/did not remember were included as 
categories; those who reported a mere belief were excluded. The predictors included were 
ideological congruency (whether a participant saw the version of the story that was in line 
with their beliefs; e.g. a Yes supporter seeing a scandal concerning the No campaign), 
whether a participant saw the same poster story twice, or saw a different version at 
follow-up, and whether the participant reported a false memory for the poster story in the 
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first study. The main effects were entered in the first block and all two-way interaction 
terms were entered in the second block.  
The first model was significant, χ2(3, N = 508) = 14.85, p = .002, R2 (Cox & Snell) = 
.03, R2 (Nagelkerke) = .05, and correctly classified 87% of cases. As shown in Table 1, 
participants were twice as likely to report a false memory for the story when it was in line 
with their beliefs. They were also twice as likely to report a false memory at follow-up if 
they had also reported a false memory in the first study. Whether participants saw the 
same or different version of the story between the first study and follow-up was not a 
significant predictor. The addition of the interaction terms in the second block improved 
the model fit (p = .003; model; χ2(6, N = 508) = 28.59, p < .001, R2 (Cox & Snell) = .06, R2 
(Nagelkerke) = .10, and correctly classified 87% of cases. While having previously 
reported a false memory and ideological congruency both remained as significant 
predictors of false memories, there was also a significant interaction between ideological 
congruency and whether participants saw the same or different version at follow up. 
Amongst those who saw the same version of the poster story on both occasions, there was 
no difference in rates of false memory for congruent (13%) and incongruent versions 
(13%). However, amongst those who saw a different version of the poster story at follow-
up, participants were more likely to report a false memory for a congruent story (23%) 
than an incongruent story (8%).   
As in our previous work, the pattern of results was broadly similar when a more 
liberal threshold for false memories was used and those who reported a mere belief that 
the event had occurred were included as ‘rememberers’. All responses, including those 
who reported a mere belief, can be seen in Figure 1. 
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Table 1 
Results from a logistic regression analysis of continuing participants’ reports of a false 
memory of the poster story at follow-up, with the following predictors: ideological 
congruency of the story, whether participants saw the same or a different version of the 
story, previously reported false memory for the story, and their interactions (n = 508). 
 
  
Predictors B SE b Wald df p Exp(b) 95% C.I. 
Model One        
Ideological Congruency 0.72 0.27 7.03 1 .008 2.06 [1.21, 3.51] 
Same Version of Story -0.21 0.27 0.60 1 .439 0.81 [0.48, 1.37] 
Previous False Memory 0.78 0.28 7.76 1 .005 2.18 [1.26, 3.78] 
Constant -2.39 0.27 78.94 1 <.001 0.09 - 
Model 2        
Ideological Congruency 2.06 0.56 13.65 1 <.001 7.82 [2.63, 23.28] 
Same Version of Story 0.91 0.58 2.48 1 .115 2.48 [0.80, 7.70] 
Previous False Memory 1.43 0.60 5.62 1 .018 4.16 [1.28, 13.55] 
Ideological Congruency*Same Version of Story -1.84 0.61 8.96 1 .003 0.16 [0.48, 0.53] 
Ideological Congruency*Previous False Memory -1.07 0.61 3.08 1 .079 0.34 [0.10, 1.13] 
Same Version of Story*Previous False Memory 0.27 0.61 0.20 1 .654 1.32 [0.40, 4.30] 
Constant -3.35 0.53 39.57 1 <.001 0.04 - 
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Figure 1: False memories and beliefs for the fabricated poster story amongst continuing participants 
(solid colour) and newly-recruited participants (dotted pattern). A) Continuing participants (n = 630) in 
the original study in May saw a fabricated news story concerning illegal campaign posters that was either 
congruent (blue) or incongruent (red) with their beliefs. B) These same continuing participants (n = 630) 
completed the follow-up study six months later, in November, where they saw either the same version of 
the poster story, or the other version. C) Newly recruited participants (n = 476) saw one story in 
November only. Note that this figure distinguishes between reported memories and mere beliefs that the 























































































f Newly Recruited Participants: Follow-Up Results





Figure 2: False memories and beliefs for a novel fabricated story concerning Facebook amongst 
continuing participants (solid colour) and newly-recruited participants (dotted pattern). Continuing 
participants (n = 630) and newly recruited participants (n = 476) saw this fake story during the follow-up 



























Specific Memory of Seeing/Hearing of the Event
FALSE MEMORY DEBRIEFING 
 18 
True Stories 
We also compared memories for true stories, to assess whether previous 
participation impacted recall of real events. In our first study, all participants saw a 
number of true stories, including either a story about athletes calling for a No vote or 
actors calling for a Yes vote. A McNemar’s test found significantly lower rates of 
remembering this pair of true stories among continuing participants in the follow-up 
study (48%) than in the first study in May (72%), X2 (1, N = 575) = 83.44, p < .001. As 
shown in Figure 3, continuing participants were shown either the same story they saw 
in the first study or the story about the other campaign. Continuing participants who 
saw the same story twice were more likely to report a memory for the event at follow-
up (70%) than those who saw a different story (44%), X2 (1, N = 529) = 35.87, p < .001, 
V = .26. This was true for both stories; Actors for Yes X2 (1, N = 252) = 15.53, p < .001, V 
= .25 and Athletes for No X2 (1, N = 277) = 18.26, p < .001, V = .26. This suggests that 
participants had not entirely forgotten their participation in the first study and there 
was some remaining memory of the stories presented at that time. 
At follow-up, all participants were presented with one of two new true stories 
concerning either a memorial that was established in Dublin the day after the 
referendum or comments made by Pope Francis concerning the referendum. Continuing 
participants were less likely to report a memory for the Pope’s comments (15%) than 
newly recruited participants (25%), X2 (1, N = 430) = 6.85, p =  .009, V = .13, but equally 
likely to report a memory for the memorial story (79%) as newly recruited participants 
(78%), X2 (1, N = 477) = 0.01, p = .907, V = .01. It is possible that the continuing 
participants were more suspicious of the Pope Francis story, due to their previous 
exposure to our fake news paradigm. This did not seem to affect rates of memory for the 
memorial story, perhaps because it was more widely publicized and better remembered 
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(as evidenced by the higher recall rate for the memorial story across both the 


















































Figure 3: Reported memories and beliefs for true events amongst continuing participants (solid colour) 
and newly-recruited participants (dotted pattern). Continuing participants were shown one of two true 
stories in the first study (concerning athletes (in black) or actors (in purple). In the follow-up study, they 
either saw the same story again (e.g. the same athletes story on both occasions) or the other story (the 
athletes story when they previously saw the actors story). Newly recruited participants saw one of the 





























Continuing Participants: Original Study Results 




























































Newly Recruited Participants: Follow-Up Results
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Post-Warning Fake News Detection 
Participants were told they may have been presented with some fake news 
stories and were asked to select any stories they believed to be fabricated. 
Continuing participants selected a similar number of stories (M = 1.83, SD = 0.77) as 
newly recruited participants (M = 1.74, SD = 0.78), t (1102) = 1.90, p = .058, d = 0.12. 
When prompted, continuing participants were equally likely to identify the 
poster story as fake at follow-up (66%) as newly recruited participants (62%), X2 (1, 
N = 1104) = 1.80, p = .179. Continuing participants were more likely to identify the 
poster story as fabricated if it was incongruent with their beliefs – that is, if it 
reflected badly on the campaign they identified with - (76%), than if the story was 
congruent with their beliefs (57%), X2 (1, N = 629) = 23.09, p < .001, V = .19.  This 
effect was also evident for newly recruited participants. They too were more likely 
to identify the poster story as fabricated if it was incongruent with their beliefs 
(70%), relative to congruent (55%), X2 (1, N = 470) = 12.61, p < .001, V = .16.  
Continuing participants were equally likely to identify the novel fake Facebook story 
as fake (78%) as newly recruited participants (75%), X2 (1, N = 1104) = 1.44, p = 
.230. 
When asked why they selected the stories as fake, 16% of continuing 
participants did not respond to this question. Of those who gave an answer, just 5% 
mentioned recognizing the story from the previous survey. Responses coded as 
mentions of the previous survey included; ‘I remembered the posters one from the 
first study as I think I chose that one as being true, and was struck by the fact I could 
be able to falsely remember things’, ‘I remember the last time I did this survey that you 
identified certain stories as fake’, ‘I think the poster example was flagged as being fake 
in your previous survey so I remember that but I think initially I thought it was true’. 
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Others mentioned having heard the story before but not as part of the study, 
possibly suggesting source confusion; ‘I remember hearing about this fake news story 
doing the rounds’, ‘I wasn't entirely sure but I had a feeling that this was a rumor 
started during the campaign but that it had proved false’. Others mentioned an 
increased suspicion of fake news due to taking part in the study; ‘I didn't remember 
them plus this study has made me more aware of fake news’, ‘I do remember there 
being controversies about pro-life posters, and some had to be taken down, but I didn't 
recollect a link to American donors.  I had to think about this though and work it 
through.  It felt familiar and possibly true, probably because it resembled a story that I 
had heard. I had to work it out in my head (probably because of the nature of the 
survey) but if I saw it in passing I doubt I'd have given it as much thought and possibly 
accepted it at face value.’ 
Participant Knowledge 
Before being debriefed, participants were asked to estimate what percentage 
of participants they would expect to report a false memory if they were exposed to 
fabricated news events. Continuing participants gave an estimate (M = 52.96%, SD = 
17.42) that was almost identical to newly recruited participants (M = 52.92%, SD = 
17.86), t (1079) = 0.04, p = .972. After being debriefed and told which stories were 
fabricated and asked to give an estimate again, both continuing participants (M = 
56.38%, SD = 18.75) and newly recruited participants (M = 56.35%, SD = 19.69) 
increased their rating by a similar amount, t (1075) = 0.01, p = .992.  
Merging the two samples, those who reported a false memory for either the 
poster or Facebook story gave similar pre-debrief estimates (M = 55.09%, SD = 
18.22) to participants who did not report a false memory (M = 52.31%, SD = 17.42), 
t (973) = 1.85, p = .065. Post-debrief, there was a larger difference between those 
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who reported a false memory (M = 62.18%, SD = 17.36) and those who did not (M = 
54.79%, SD = 19.43), t (260.85) = 4.92, p < .001, d = 0.40, suggesting that those who 
were told that they had reported a false memory revised their estimates upwards. 
We also assessed whether those who had reported a false memory in our first study 
six months previously (and been debriefed) would give higher estimates during the 
follow-up. We found no difference in the pre-debrief ratings of continuing 
participants who had previously reported a false memory (M = 54.26%, SD = 16.38) 
and those who did not (M = 51.87%, SD = 17.68), t (545) = 1.38, p = .170. 
At the end of the study, participants were asked about their experience, with 
all questions answered on a 1-7 scale, where 1 indicated strong disagreement and 7 
indicated strong agreement.  Participants reported understanding which stories 
were true and which were fabricated (M = 5.09, SD = 1.44), being confident that they 
would be able to identify the stories as fake if they saw them again (M = 5.37, SD = 
1.41), that they enjoyed participating in this part of the study (M = 5.68, SD = 1.09), 
that they had learned more about false memories (M = 5.08, SD = 1.18) and that they 
found it interesting to test their susceptibility to fake news (M = 5.98, SD = 1.03).  
There were no significant differences between continuing and newly recruited 
participants on any of these measures (all p > .05).  
Discussion 
 
The current study followed up participants six months after they completed 
our experiment where we exposed them to fabricated political news stories. We 
compared their rates of false memories at follow-up both to their rates in the 
original study and to newly recruited participants. Across the entire sample, 36% of 
participants reported a memory or belief for at least one fabricated event. As in our 
first study (Murphy et al., 2019), ideological congruency was a strong predictor of 
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participants reporting a false memory for the fabricated poster story and of 
identifying the story as fake after being warned of the purpose of the study. This 
again demonstrates that false memories are likely to form in line with existing 
beliefs. 
 Though research has shown that misinformation can be difficult to correct 
(Lewandowsky et al., 2012), continuing participants were in fact slightly less likely 
to fall for the fake news story concerning illegal posters than newly recruited 
participants. This was true whether we assessed reported memories only, or 
included mere beliefs in a less conservative classification of memory (Wade et al., 
2018). Amongst continuing participants, there was no increase in false memories for 
those who saw the same version of the poster story (e.g. concerning the Yes 
campaign on both occasions) compared to those who saw a different version (e.g. 
the No campaign story in the first study but the Yes campaign version at follow-up).  
This is in contrast to the illusory truth effect literature that might predict increased 
belief after repetition (Dechêne et al., 2010). The qualitative responses suggest that 
a small minority of participants (5%) remembered seeing the events in our previous 
study, or at least explicitly stated that that they did. Our primary concern was that 
participants from our study would be more vulnerable to falling for the same 
fabricated story in future, but we have found no evidence of that.  
 In addition, there was a significant interaction between seeing the same 
version of the poster story and ideological congruency. Participants who saw the 
same version of the poster story on both occasions demonstrated no effect of 
congruency. In contrast, those who saw a different version of the poster story at 
follow-up were significantly more likely to report a false memory for a story that 
was in line with their beliefs, a pattern similar to that observed amongst newly 
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recruited participants at follow-up. This is in line with what we observed in our 
original study (Murphy et al., 2019) and has been demonstrated in other contexts 
(Frenda et al., 2013). It appears that participating in the study (and being debriefed) 
eliminates the congruency effect if exposed to the story again, but only if the exact 
same story is presented on both occasions. These findings speak to the narrow 
effect of previous participation, which did not generalise even to the exact same 
story presented about the opposite campaign. There is mixed evidence concerning 
the effect of attitude congruency on misinformation retraction (Ecker et al., 2014), 
and further study is warranted.  
Interestingly, continuing participants were significantly less likely to report a 
false memory for the novel fake story presented at follow-up (concerning foreign 
interference in the referendum via Facebook). This may be due to the fact that they 
were aware we were investigating fake news and thus were more suspicious and 
better at detecting the fabricated event. Indeed, once we alerted participants to the 
fact that they may have seen fake news stories, newly recruited participants were as 
likely as continuing participants to select the story as fabricated. This further 
supports the idea that the naiveté of the new recruits drove the difference in initial 
reported memories for the story. Research has shown that warnings can sometimes 
reduce false memory rates (Ecker et al., 2010; Gerrie & Garry, 2011). It is difficult to 
draw firm conclusions based on a single item, but this warrants further 
investigation, as it may evidence a benefit of participating in a false memory study; 
greater suspicion of fake news stories.  Future research might also investigate 
whether this reduced tendency to report false memories would generalize to news 
presented from other sources, i.e. whether after participating in a false memory 
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study, participants might be more suspicious of fake news presented on a news site 
or in another study not associated with the original researchers.  
 We observed a clearer effect of previous participation for the true news 
stories. We directly compared memories for two news stories concerning either 
athletes or actors endorsing either side of the campaign. We found that when 
participants were presented with the same story at follow-up that they had seen in 
our first study (e.g. athletes on both occasions), they were more likely to report a 
memory for that event than if they saw two different news stories. This suggests 
that even though there was quite a long time period between participation and 
follow-up, there was some residual effect of participation and some memory of the 
study was intact. Of the two novel (non-repeated) true stories presented in this 
study, continuing participants were less likely to report a memory for one of the 
events, relative to newly-recruited participants. It may be that previous 
participation increased suspicion or encouraged stricter source-monitoring, as with 
the novel fake story, but this warrants further investigation in future research.  
 Finally, we assessed whether there were any benefits from participating in 
such a study. We found participants generally enjoyed taking part in the study and 
found it interesting. This is an important finding, as previous studies have found 
mixed reactions to deception in psychology research (Hertwig & Ortmann, 2008). 
There was no evidence that participants became more aware of the phenomenon of 
false memories or estimated them to be more common. This was difficult to assess 
due to a ceiling effect – both new and continuing participants gave high estimates of 
false memory rates (> 50%) and those rates increased if they found out that they 
themselves had reported a false memory. This average estimate was significantly 
higher than the rate of false memory we observed in the current study, as well as 
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that observed in most false memory studies (Loftus, 2005). Given the ongoing 
debate concerning public perceptions of memory reliability and whether non-
psychologists perceive memory to work ‘like a video camera’ (Brewin et al., 2019; 
Otgaar et al, 2020; Simons & Chabris, 2011), this high estimate is noteworthy. 
Participants, both newly recruited and those who had previously participated in a 
false memory study, may actually overestimate the likelihood of false memories 
forming in response to fake news articles.  
 It is important to note the long delay between the first study and follow-up. 
Our follow-up period of six months might have resulted in participants simply 
forgetting about the study and thus any effects that may have been evident may 
have been lost. The qualitative evidence supports this, as very few participants 
reported remembering the story from the first study. However, we would note that 
there was a clear effect of previous participation in the case of the true events, 
despite the long delay.  
 A sizeable minority of continuing participants reported a false memory for 
the fabricated event (14%), despite being debriefed after the original study. Those 
who had reported a false memory in the first study were also more likely to report a 
false memory in the current study. Future research might examine the 
characteristics of these false memories reported by continuing participants. It is 
possible that the debrief was entirely forgotten or not believed to begin with, as 
some studies have noted that participants can reject the debriefing and insist the 
fabricated event did happen (Otgaar et al., 2009). Alternatively, participants may 
have been reporting non-believed memories at follow-up (Mazzoni et al., 2010; 
Otgaar et al., 2014). That is, some who reported a false memory of the fabricated 
event after debriefing may no longer have believed that the event actually occurred. 
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If so, this would suggest that debriefing was partially successful for these 
participants. Thus, future research might assess confidence and belief in these 
memories at follow-up to further examine any effects of debriefing.  
In conclusion, our study suggests that participating in our fake news study 
did not negatively impact participants’ memories. Relative to new recruits, 
continuing participants were less likely to report a false memory for a story that 
they had been previously exposed to and less likely to report a false memory for a 
novel fake news story. Participants reported enjoying the experiments and feeling 
confident that they understood which stories were fake after they had been 
debriefed. Our study does not suggest that exposure to fabricated political events 
during these types of misinformation studies will negatively affect vulnerability to 
fake news in the medium-to-long term future. 
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Appendix A: News Stories Presented in Follow-Up Study 
 
True & Novel 
 
During his official visit to Ireland, Pope Francis questioned whether a “materialistic 
‘throwaway culture’” has made people “increasingly indifferent to the poor and to 
the most defenseless members of our human family, including the unborn, deprived 
of the very right to life”. 
 




After voting in the eighth amendment referendum, many left flowers and 
messages at a mural of Savita Halappanavar in Dublin. 
 
Used with permission of author, ‘lusciousblopster’ 
https://www.flickr.com/photos/lusciousblopster/42482245331  
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True & Previously Seen 
 
A number of Irish actors including Saoirse Ronan, Cillian Murphy & Liam 
Cunningham featured in a Together For Yes Youtube video titled ‘In Ireland Today’. 
The celebrities called for a Yes vote in the referendum. 
 
(Screenshot taken from Youtube) 
 
 
A number of GAA stars called for a No vote in the 8th amendment referendum. The 
group, including Aoife Cassidy (Derry, All Ireland Camogie winning Captain) and 
Micky Harte (Tyrone Manager) released a number of Youtube videos detailing why 
they are voting No. 
 
(Screenshot taken from Youtube)  
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Facebook offered a formal apology to Irish voters after evidence emerged that Irish 
voter profiles had been sold to Russian campaigners seeking to influence the 
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Fabricated & Previously Seen 
 
(participants saw either the Yes or No version of this story) 
 
 
 
 
